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Abstract. Approximate computing (AC) is an emerging paradigm for
energy-efficient computation. The basic idea of AC is to sacrifice high
precision for low energy by allowing for hardware which only carries out
”approximately correct” calculations. For software verification, this chal-
lenges the validity of verification results for programs run on approximate
hardware.
In this paper, we present a novel approach to examine program cor-
rectness in the context of approximate computing. In contrast to all
existing approaches, we start with a standard program verification and
compute the allowed tolerances for AC hardware from that verification
run. More precisely, we derive a set of constraints which – when met by
the AC hardware – guarantees the verification result to carry over to
AC. Our approach is based on the framework of abstract interpretation.
On the practical side, we furthermore (1) show how to extract tolerance
constraints from verification runs employing predicate abstraction as an
instance of abstract interpretation, and (2) show how to check such con-
straints on hardware designs. We exemplify our technique on example C
programs and a number of recently proposed approximate adders.
1 Introduction
Approximate computing (AC) [21,16] is a new computing paradigm which aims
at reducing energy consumption at the cost of computation precision. A number
of application domains can tolerate AC because they are inherently resilient to
imprecision (e.g., machine learning, big data analytics, image processing, speech
recognition). Computation precision can be reduced by either directly manip-
ulating program executions on the algorithmic level (e.g. by loop perforation
[10]) or by employing approximate hardware for program execution [27]. Ap-
proximation on the level of hardware can be achieved by techniques like voltage
overscaling or by directly making imprecise hardware designs with less chip area.
The approximate adders which we will later use employ the latter technique, and
simply have limited carry propagation.
For software verification, the use of approximate hardware challenges sound-
ness and raises the question of whether the achieved verification result will really
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be valid when the program is being executed. So far, correctness in the con-
text of approximate computing has either studied quantitative reliability, i.e.,
the probability that outputs of functions have correct values [11,24] (employed
for the language Rely), or differences between approximate and precise exe-
cutions [22,14] (applying differential program verification). Alternatively, some
approaches plainly use types and type checking to separate the program into pre-
cise and approximate parts (language EnerJ) [27]. All of these techniques take a
hardware-centric approach: take the (non-)guarantees of the hardware, and de-
velop new analysis methods working under such weak guarantees. The opposite
direction, namely use standard program analysis procedures and have the veri-
fication impose constraints on the allowed approximation, has not been studied
so far. This is despite the fact that such an approach directly allows re-use of ex-
isting verification technology for program verification as well as for checking the
constraints on the approximate hardware. Another advantage of this approach
is that the imposed constraints can be checked on multiple hardware designs, as
we did in our examples.
In this paper, we propose a new strategy for making software verification reliable
for approximate computing. Within the broad spectrum of AC techniques, we
focus on deterministic approximate designs, i.e., approximate hardware designs
with deterministic truth tables. We start with a verification run proving safety of
a program. For the moment on, we assume that the safety property is encoded
with assertions or specific error labels ERR. With a proper instrumentation of
the program various properties can be encoded in such a way. In Section 4 we
exemplary describe how to encode termination proofs.
Our approach derives from that verification run requirements on the hard-
ware executing the program. We call such requirements tolerance constraints. A
tolerance constraint acts like a pre/postcondition pair and describes the expected
output of a hardware design when supplied with specified inputs. The derived
tolerance constraints capture the assumptions the verification run has made on
the executing hardware. Thus, they are specific to the program and safety prop-
erty under consideration. Tolerance constraints refer to program statements,
e.g., statements using addition as operation. Typically, tolerance constraints are
much less restrictive than the precise truth table of a hardware operation would
dictate.
To instantiate this general idea, we had to select the underlying verification
technique. We discuss the alternatives in Section 7, after we presented our con-
crete instantiation. In the following, we formulate the derivation of tolerance
constraints within the framework of abstract interpretation, thus, making the
technique applicable to all abstract interpretation based program analyses. We
prove soundness of our technique by showing that a program, which has been
proven correct, will also run correctly on AC when the employed approximate
hardware satisfies the derived tolerance constraints.
To see our technique in practice, we instantiate the general framework based
on abstract interpretation with predicate abstraction [15,3]. In this case, toler-
ance constraints are pairs (p, q) of predicates on inputs and expected outputs
int arr[1000];
for(int j:=0;j<990;) {
j:=j+10;
if (!(j>=0 && j<1000))
ERR: ;
arr[j]:=0;
}
int u:=input();
int sum:=1;
if (u>0)
sum:=1+u;
if (sum==0)
ERR: ;
Fig. 1. Programs Array (left) and AddOne (right)
of a hardware operation. As a first example, take a look at the left program in
Figure 1. The left program writes to an array within a for-loop. The property
to be checked (encoded as an error state ERR) is an array-index-inside-bounds
check. Using x and y as inputs and z as output (i.e., z = x + y), the tolerance
constraint on addition (+) derived from a verification run showing correctness
is
(x ≥ 0 ∧ x ≤ 989 ∧ y = 10⇒ z ≥ 0 ∧ z ≤ 999)
It states that the hardware adder should guarantee that adding 10 to a value
in between 0 and 989 never brings us outside the range [0, 999], and thus the
program never crashes with an index-out-of-bounds exception.
Using the analysis tool CPAchecker [8] for verification runs, we imple-
mented the extraction of tolerance constraints from abstract reachability graphs
constructed during verification. The constraints will be in SMT-Lib format [4].
To complete the picture, we have furthermore implemented a procedure for toler-
ance checking on hardware designs. This technique constructs a specific checker
circuit out of a given hardware design (in Verilog) and tolerance constraint. We
have evaluated our overall approach on example C programs, e.g., taken from
the software verification competition benchmark, using as AC hardware different
approximate adders from the literature (Verilog designs taken from the website
accompanying [29]). During evaluation, we examined if a program which uses an
approximate adder still terminates, adheres to a protocol, or remains memory
safe. Additionally, we looked at certain properties of additions like monotonicity
to capture the different behavior of precise and approximate adders.
2 Background
We start by formally defining the syntax and semantics of programs, and by
introducing the framework of abstract interpretation [13].
Programs. For our formal framework, we assume programs to have integer vari-
ables only1, Ops = {+,−, ∗, \} to be the set of binary operators on integers, Z to
be the integer constants and Cmp = {<,≤, >,≥,=} the set of comparison oper-
ators on integers. Programs use variables out of a set Var , and have two sorts of
1 For the practical evaluation we, however, allow for arbitrary C programs.
statements from a set Stm: (1) conditionals assume b (b boolean condition over
Var formed using Ops and Cmp) and (2) assignments v:=expr, v ∈ V ar, expr
expression over Var formed with Ops. Formally, programs are given by control
flow automata.
Definition 1. A control flow automaton (CFA) P = (L, `0, E,Err) consists
of a finite set of locations L, an initial location `0 ∈ L and a set of edges
E ⊆ L× Stm × L and a set of error locations Err ⊆ L.
Note that we mark the error locations in programs with the label ERR (or similar).
A concrete state of a program is a mapping s : Var → Z, and Σ is the set of
all states. For a state s, we define a state update wrt. u ∈ Var and c ∈ Z to
be s[u := c](u) = c, s[u := c](v) = s(v) for u 6= v. For a state s and a boolean
condition b, we write s |= b to state that b is true in s. A configuration of a
program is a pair (s, `), s ∈ Σ, ` ∈ L.
The semantics of program statements is given by the following (partial) next
transformers nextstm : Σ → Σ with
nextstm(s) = s
′ with
{
s′ = s if stm ≡ assume b ∧ s |= b
s′ = s[v := s(expr)] if stm ≡ v:=expr
We lift nextstm to sets of states by nextstm(S) = {nextstm(s) | s ∈ S}. Note
that this lifted function is total. The next transformers together with the control
flow determine the transition system of a program.
Definition 2. The concrete transition system T (P ) = (Q, q0,−→) of a CFA
P = (L, `0, E,Err) consists of
– a set of configurations Q = Σ × L,
– an initial configuration q0 = (s0, `0) where s0(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V ar,
– a transition relation −→ ⊆ Q×Stm×Q with (s, `) −stm−−→ (s′, `′) if (`, stm, `′) ∈
E and nextstm(s) = s
′.
An error location is reachable in T (P ) if there is a path from (s0, `0) to a con-
figuration (∗, `) with ` ∈ Err . If no error location is reachable, we say that the
transition system is free of errors.
Abstract interpretation. For verifying that a program is free of errors, we use
the framework of abstract interpretation (AI) [13]. Thus we assume that the
verification run from which we derive tolerance constraints is carried out by an
analysis tool employing abstract interpretation as basic verification technology.
Instead of concrete states, instances of AI frameworks employ abstract do-
mains Abs and execute abstract versions of the next transformers on it. Ab-
stract domains are equipped with an ordering vAbs, and (Abs,vAbs) has to
form a complete lattice (as does (2Σ ,⊆)). To relate abstract and concrete do-
main, two monotonic functions are used: an abstraction function α : 2Σ → Abs
and a concretisation function γ : Abs → 2Σ . The pair (α, γ) has to form a
Galois connection, i.e. the following has to hold: ∀S ∈ 2Σ : S ⊆ γ(α(S)) and
∀abs ∈ Abs : α(γ(abs)) vAbs abs. We require the least element of the lattice
(Abs,vAbs) (which we denote by a⊥) to be mapped onto the least element of
(2Σ ,⊆) which is the empty set ∅.
On the abstract domain, the AI instance defines a total abstract next trans-
former next#stm : Abs → Abs. To be useful for verification, the abstract trans-
former has to faithfully reflect the behaviour of the concrete transformer.
Definition 3. An abstract next transformer next#stm : Abs → Abs is a safe
approximation of the concrete next transformer if the following holds:
∀abs ∈ Abs,∀stm ∈ Stm : α(nextstm(γ(abs)) vAbs next#stm(abs)
Using the abstract next transformer, we can construct an abstract transition
system of a program.
Definition 4. The abstract transition system T#(P ) = (Q, q0,−→) of a program
P with respect to an abstract domain Abs and functions next#stm consists of
– a set of configurations Q = Abs× L,
– an initial configuration q0 = (a0, `0) where a0 = α({s0}) with s0(v) = 0 for
all v ∈ V ar,
– a transition relation −→ ⊆ Q×Stm×Q with (a, `) −stm−−→ (a′, `′) if (`, stm, `′) ∈
E and next#stm(a) = a
′.
An abstract configuration (a, `) is reachable in T#(P ) if there is a path from q0 =
(a0, `0) to a configuration (a, `). We denote the set of reachable configurations
in T#(P ) by Reach(T#(P )) or simply Reach#. An error location is reachable
in T#(P ) if there is a path from (a0, `0) to a configuration (a, `) with ` ∈ Err ,
a 6= a⊥. Note that we allow paths to configurations (a⊥, `), ` ∈ Err , since
a⊥ represents the empty set of concrete states, and thus does not stand for a
concretely reachable error.
The abstract transition system can be used for checking properties of the
concrete program whenever the abstract transformers are safe approximations.
Theorem 1. Let P be a CFA, T its concrete and T# its abstract transition
system according to some abstract domain and safe abstract next transformer.
Then the following holds: If T# is free of errors, so is T .
3 Transformer Constraints
The framework of abstract interpretation is used to verify that a program is free
of errors. To this end, the abstract transition system is build and inspected for
reachable error locations. However, the construction of the abstract transition
system and thus the soundness of verification relies on the fact that the abstract
transformer safely approximates the concrete transformer, and this in particu-
lar means that we verify properties of a program execution using the concrete
transformers for next state computation. This assumption is not true anymore
when we run our programs on approximate hardware.
For a setting with approximate hardware, we have approximate next trans-
formers nextACstm for (some or all) of our statements. The key question is now
the following: Under which conditions on these approximate transformers will
our verification result carry over to the AC setting? To this end, we need to
find out what ”properties” of a statement the verification run has actually used.
This can be seen in the abstract transition system by looking at the transitions
labelled with a specific statement, and extracting the abstract states before and
after this statement. A tolerance constraint for a statement includes all such
pairs of abstract states, specifying a number of pre- and postconditions for the
statement.
Definition 5. Let T# = (Q, q0,−→) be an abstract transition system of a pro-
gram P , stm ∈ Stm a statement. Let ((ai1, `i1) −stm−−→ (ai2, `i2))i∈I be the family of
transitions in −stm−−→ ∩(Reach# ×Reach#).
The tolerance constraint for stm in T# is the family of pairs of abstract states
((ai1, a
i
2))i∈I .
While the concrete transformers by safe approximation fulfill all these con-
straints, the approximate transformers might or might not adhere to the con-
straints.
Definition 6. A next transformer nextACstm : Σ → Σ fulfills a tolerance con-
straint ((ai1, a
i
2))i∈I if the following property holds for all i ∈ I:
s ∈ γ(ai1)⇒ nextACstm(s) ∈ γ(ai2) .
When programs are run on approximate hardware, the execution will use some
approximate and some precise next transformers depending on the actual hard-
ware. For instance, the execution might employ an approximate adder, and thus
all statements using addition will be approximate. We let TAC(P ) be the tran-
sition system of program P constructed by using nextACstm for the approximate
statements and standard concrete transformers for the rest. This lets us now
formulate our main theorem about the validity of verification results on AC
hardware.
Theorem 2. Let P be a program and nextACstm be a next transformer for stm
fulfilling the tolerance constraint on stm derived from an abstract transition sys-
tem T#(P ) wrt. some abstract domain Abs and safe abstract next transfomers.
Then we get:
If T#(P ) is free of errors, so is TAC(P ).
Proof: Let ((ai1, a
i
2))i∈I be the tolerance constraint for stm in T
#(P ). Assume
the contrary, i.e., there is a path to an error location in TAC : (s0, `0) −stm0−−−→
(s1, `1) −stm1−−−→ . . . −stmn−1−−−−→ (sn, `n) such that `n ∈ Err. We show by induction
that there exists a path (a0, `0) −stm0−−−→ (a1, `1) −stm1−−−→ . . . −stmn−1−−−−→ (an, `n) in the
abstract transition system T# such that sj ∈ γ(aj).
Induction base. s0 ∈ γ(a0) since a0 = α({s0}) and {s0} ⊆ γ(α({s0})) by
Galois connection properties.
Induction step. Let sj ∈ γ(aj), nextstmj (sj) = sj+1 and (`j , stmj , `j+1) ∈ E.
Let Sj = γ(aj) (hence sj ∈ Sj). Now we need to consider two cases:
Case (1): stmj 6= stm: Then the next transformer applied to reach the next
configuration is the standard transfomer. Thus let nextstmj (γ(aj)) = Sj+1.
By safe approximation of next#, we get α(Sj+1) vAbs next#stmj (aj) = aj+1.
By monotonicity of γ: γ(α(Sj+1)) ⊆ γ(aj+1). By Galois connection: Sj+1 ⊆
γ(α(Sj+1)). Hence, by transitivity sj+1 ∈ γ(aj+1).
Case (2): stmj = stm: Let next
#
stm(aj) = aj+1. By definition of tolerance
constraint extraction, the pair (aj , aj+1) has to be in the family of tolerance
constraints, i.e., ∃i ∈ I : (aj , aj+1) = (ai1, ai2). Since nextACstm fulfills the
constraint, nextACstmj (sj) ∈ γ(aj+1). 
4 Preserving termination
So far, we have been interested in the preservation of already proven safety prop-
erties on approximate hardware. Another important issue is the preservation of
termination: whenever we have managed to show that a program terminates on
precise hardware, we would also like to get constraints that guarantee termina-
tion on AC hardware. In order to extend our approach to termination, we make
use of an approach for encoding termination proofs as safety properties [12].
We start with explaining standard termination proofs. Nontermination arises
when we have loops in programs and the loop condition never gets false in a
program execution. In control flow automata, a loop is a sequence of locations
`0, . . . , `n such that there are statements stmi, i = 0..n − 1, with `i −stmi−−→ `i+1
and `0 = `n. In this, a location ` = `i is said to be on the loop. Every well-
structured loop has a condition and a loop body: the start of a loop body is
a location ` such that there are locations `′, `′′ and a boolean condition b s.t.
`′ −assume b−−−−−−→ ` and `′ −assume !b−−−−−−→ `′′ are in the CFA and `′ is on a loop, but
either `′′ is not on a loop, or is on a different loop. Basically, we just consider
CFAs of programs constructed with while or for constructs, not with gotos or
recursion. However, the latter is also possible when the verification technique
used for proving termination covers such programs.
Definition 7. A non-terminating run of a CFA P = (L, `0, E,Err) is an infi-
nite sequence of configurations and statements (s0, `0) −stm1−−−→ (s1, `1) −stm2−−−→ . . .
in the transition system T (P ). If P has no non-terminating runs, then P termi-
nates.
Proposition 1. In every non-terminating run, at least one loop start ` occurs
infinitely often.
We assume some standard technique to be employed for proving termination.
Such techniques typically consist of (a) the synthesis of a termination argu-
ment, and (b) the check of validity of this termination argument. Termination
arguments are either given as monolithic ranking functions or as disjunctively
well-founded transition invariants [26]. Here, we will describe the technique for
monolithic ranking functions.
1. For every loop starting in `, define a ranking function f` on the program
variables, i.e., f` : Σ → W , where (W,≤) is a well-founded order with least
element ⊥W .
2. Show f` to decrease with every loop execution, i.e., if (s, `) −stm1−−−→ (s1, `1) −stm2−−−→
. . . −stmn−−−→ (s′, `) is a path in T (P ), show f`(s′) < f`(s).
3. Show f` to be greater or equal than the least element of W at loop start,
i.e., for all starts of loop bodies ` and (s, `) ∈ QT (P ), show f`(s) ≥ ⊥W .
If properties (2) and (3) hold, we say that the ranking function is valid. Note
that we are not interested in computing ranking functions here; we just want to
make use of existing verification techniques. The following proposition states a
standard result for ranking functions (see e.g. [23,20]).
Proposition 2. Let P be a program. If every loop ` of P has a valid ranking
function, then P terminates.
As an example consider the program Sum on the left of Figure 2. It computes
the sum of all numbers from 0 up to some constant N . It terminates since
variable i is constantly increased. As ranking function we can take N − i using
the well-founded ordering N.
In order to encode the above technique in terms of assertions, we instrument
a program P along the lines used in the tool Terminator [12] thereby getting
a program P̂ as follows. Let Var = {x1, . . . , xn} be the set of variables occuring
in the program. At starts of loop bodies ` we insert
if (!(f_l(x1, ..., xn) >= bot_W)
ERR:
old_x1 := x1;
...
old_xn := xn;
and at loop ends we insert
if (!(f_l(x1, ..., xn) <_W f_l(old_x1, ..., old_xn))
ERR:
when given a ranking function f` and a well-founded ordering (W,<W ) with
bottom element bot_W.
Proposition 3. If P̂ if free of errors, then P terminates.
Hence we can use standard safety proving for termination as well (once we have a
ranking function), and thereby derive tolerance constraints. In the left of Figure 2
we see the instrumented version of program Sum. Here, we have already applied
an optimization: we only make a copy of variable i since the ranking function
only refers to i and N, and N does not change anyway.
sum=0;
i=0;
while (i<N) {
sum=sum+i;
i=i+1;
}
sum=0;
i=0;
while (i<N) {
if (!(N-i > 0))
ERR: ;
old_i=i;
sum=sum+i;
i=i+1;
if (!(N-i < N-old_i))
ERR: ;
}
Fig. 2. Program Sum (on the left) and its instrumented version (on the right).
5 Constraint Extraction for Predicate Analysis
Section 3 has formally defined the extraction of tolerance constraints from ab-
stract transition systems and has proven its soundness. Now, we will take a closer
look at constraint extraction in practice. To this end, we choose an instance of
the abstract interpretation framework, namely predicate abstraction [15,3]. Fur-
thermore, instead of deriving constraints for statements, we derive constraints for
operators since in practice we do not have specific hardware for whole statements
but just for the operations used in expressions within a statement.
We start with defining predicate abstraction. For this, we fix a set of pred-
icates P over Var ,Cmp,Z and Ops. In practice, these predicates will be in-
crementally computed by a counter-example-guided abstraction refinement ap-
proach [17] which we just assume to exist (and which is provided by the tool
that we employ for our experiments). We define ¬P := {¬p | p ∈ P} and let
the abstract domain Abs be conjunctions of predicates or their negations (also
directly written as set of literals, hence ∅ is true, P ∪ ¬P is false):
({
∧
q∈Q
q | Q ⊆ P ∪ ¬P},⇒)
The Galois connection is given by letting α(S) = {q ∈ P ∪ ¬P | ∀s ∈ S : s |= q}
and γ(Q) := {s ∈ Σ | ∀q ∈ Q : s |= q}. We write s |= Q iff s |= q for all q ∈ Q.
For the definition of the abstract next transformers see for instance [3]. Note that
tolerance constraints in this domain take the form (Q1, Q2), Qj ⊆ P ∪ ¬P, j ∈
{1, 2}.
This abstract domain can be used to show program Array from Figure 1
to be free of errors. Figure 3 shows the abstract transition system of program
Array using the predicate set P = {j ≥ 0, j ≤ 989, j ≤ 999}. The predicates
holding in an abstract configuration (a, `), i.e., the abstract state a, are written
next to the purple location. We see that the location labeled err occurs in the
graph, but the abstract state in this configuration is a⊥ = false, and, thus, we
say that this error is not reachable.
`0
true
`1 true
`2j ≥ 0
`3 j ≥ 0 ∧ j ≤ 989
`4 j ≥ 0 ∧ j ≤ 999
`5 j ≥ 0 err false
`6 j ≥ 0
int arr[1000];
¬(j<990)
int j=0;
j<990
j:=j+10;
j ≥ 0 ∧ j < 1000 ¬(j ≥ 0 ∧ j < 1000)
arr[j]:=0;
Fig. 3. Abstract transition system of program Array
For the extraction of tolerance constraints for operators op ∈ Op, we assume
our statements to take the form of three-address code (3AC) [1]. In three-address
code form, all operators op occur in programs only in statements v := a op b,
where a and b are variables or constants. Every program can be brought in such
a form (e.g., intermediate representations generated during compilation take
this form). We use this 3AC form because we need to isolate operators, and
only have statements with one (possibly approximate) operator in. Note that
program Array is in 3AC form.
Furthermore, the tolerance constraints, i.e., pre- and postcondition predi-
cates, derived from abstract transition systems are specified over the program
variables. As an example, take the operator +. In the program Array this opera-
tor occurs in the statement j:=j+10. The tolerance constraint for this statement
derived from the abstract transition system in Figure 3 is (j ≥ 0 ∧ j ≤ 989, j ≥
0∧j ≤ 999). This constraint refers to the program variable j. If the approximate
adder used for + has inputs x and y and output z, this constraint first of all
needs to be brought into a form using variables x, y and z. This is achieved using
the following replacement operator.
Definition 8. Let Q ∈ P ∪ ¬P, p ∈ Q, v1, v2 ∈ V ar. The predicate p[v2 . v1]
is obtained from p by replacing all occurrences of v2 by v1. We lift this to sets
by letting Q[v2 . v1] := {q[v2 . v1] | q ∈ Q}. For constants c ∈ Z, we define
Q[c . v1] := Q ∪ {v1 = c}.
Proposition 4. For all q ∈ P ∪ ¬P such that x /∈ vars(q):
s[x := s(u)] |= q[u . x] ⇔ s |= q
For constraint (Q1, Q2) = (j ≥ 0∧ j ≤ 989, j ≥ 0∧ j ≤ 999), statement j:=j+10
and adder with inputs x and y, output z, the replacement we need to make is
(Q1[j . x, 10 . y], Q2[j . z]) = (x ≥ 0 ∧ x ≤ 989 ∧ y = 10, z ≥ 0 ∧ z ≤ 999).
This is the constraint which ultimately needs to be checked for the approximate
hardware. In the following we assume all binary operators to have signature
(x : Z, y : Z) → (z : Z), x, y and z to not occur as variables in the program nor
in the predicates and use (Q̂1, Q̂2) to refer to the constraints obtained after the
replacement.
Definition 9. An approximate operator opAC : Z×Z→ Z adheres to a tolerance
constraint (Q̂1, Q̂2) (i.e., over x, y and z) if
∀s ∈ Σ : s |= Q̂1 ⇒ s[z := opAC(s(x), s(y))] |= Q̂2
Adherence to constraints by operators implies adherence to constraints by state-
ments using these operators.
Lemma 1. Let (Q1, Q2) be a tolerance constraint extracted from T
# for stm ≡
u := v opw. If opAC adheres to (Q1[v . x,w . y], Q2[u . z]), then next
AC
stm :≡ u :=
v opAC w adheres to (Q1, Q2).
Proof: We need to show that nextACstm adheres to (Q1, Q2). We first of all take
the definition of it and rewrite it a little.
s ∈ γ(Q1)⇒ nextACstm(s) ∈ γ(Q2)
⇔ { definition of nextACstm }
s ∈ γ(Q1)⇒ s[u := opAC(s(v), s(w))] ∈ γ(Q2)
⇔ { definition of γ }
s |= Q1 ⇒ s[u := opAC(s(v), s(w))] |= Q2
The last implication is now shown as follows:
s |= Q1 ⇒ s[x := s(v), y := s(w)] |= Q1[v . x,w . y]
⇒ s[x := s(v), y := s(w), z := opAC(s(v), s(w))] |= Q2[u . z]
⇒ s[x := s(v), y := s(w), u := opAC(s(v), s(w))] |= Q2
⇒ s[u := opAC(s(v), s(w))] |= Q2

This finally gives us our main soundness result for predicate analysis which is
an immediately corollary of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. Let T# be an abstract transition system constructed using safe
approximations and let all approximate operators opAC adhere to the constraints
derived from T#. Then: If T# is free of errors, so is TAC .
Implementation. As proof of concept we integrated our proposed constraint ex-
traction into the software analysis tool CPAchecker [8], a tool for C program
analysis which is configurable to abstract interpretation based analyses. Mainly,
we added a constraint extraction algorithm plus some additional helper classes.
Our constraint extraction algorithm builds on top of CPAchecker’s predicate
analysis which uses the technique of adjustable block enconding [7], a technique
which allows to specify at which locations an abstraction should be computed.
For our extraction we need to make sure that we have an abstract state im-
mediately before and after each statement which uses the operation of interest
op2. To identify these abstraction points and later the tolerance constraints, we
first need to identify the statements using the operation op. Afterwards, we run
CPAchecker’s standard predicate analysis which provides us with an abstract
reachability graph (ARG), a structure similar to the abstract transition system.
In the ARG, the predicates are given in SMT-Lib format [4] since CPAchecker
is using state-of-art SMT solvers for predicate analysis. From the ARG, we ex-
tract the tolerance constraints and write one SMT file per constraint (Q1, Q2)
which is in the input format required by our next tool building the hardware
checker. The SMT file mainly contains the description of (Q1, Q2) pairs plus
additional information about the signature of the statement for which the con-
straint was extracted. The signature is needed by the next tool to construct
(Q̂1, Q̂2).
To run the tolerance constraint extraction within CPAchecker, one can use
the configuration file predicateAnalysis-ToleranceConstraintsExtraction-
PLUS.properties that we used in our evaluation to extract tolerance constraints
for additions.
6 Constraint Checking
The final step of our technique is the check of the extracted constraints on actual
hardware designs of approximate operations. For simplicity of representation, we
restrict the following explanations to the case of a single constraint3. The input
to the checking phase thus consists of a constraint (Q1, Q2), an approximate op-
erator opAC and the corresponding program statement u := v opw. The checking
of the constraint on a given hardware design with inputs x, y and output z (in
our case specified in Verilog) proceeds in three steps:
Mapping The mapped tolerance constraint (Q̂1, Q̂2) = (Q1[v.x,w.y], Q2[u.z])
is constructed. As a result, the tolerance constraint (Q̂1, Q̂2) uses the vari-
ables x, y and z when referring to the inputs and output of opAC . Additional
variables of the program (besides u, v and w) may still occur in the constraint
which are not used in the hardware design. We denote these variables as side
variables.
2 The operation of interest is made configurable in CPAchecker.
3 A generalization to a family of constraints is straightforward.
Transformation The mapped constraint is transformed into Verilog code giv-
ing a checker circuit. The checker circuit is created as Verilog code in two
steps. First, the logical formulae of the tolerance constraints are compiled
to Verilog code (see [25]). In this, side variables are treated like other in-
puts. We then fix a single output of the checker called error by setting
error := ¬(Q̂1 ⇒ Q̂2).
Combination The generated tolerance constraint checker is afterwards com-
bined with the hardware design of opAC into an adherence checker. For our
examples, the AC hardware designs are also given in Verilog. The combina-
tion is done using a top module that contains and wires the design of opAC
and the tolerance checker as sub-modules. The wiring is done as depicted in
Figure 4.
The resulting circuit is afterwards checked for safety, i.e., that for no combina-
tions of values on the primary inputs the error flag is raised. This step can be
done using standard hardware verification techniques (unsatisfiability checking).
(x,y)
error
2*Nin
Nout
Tolerance 
Constraint 
Checker
AC Design
z = opAC(x,y)
Side variables
1
2*Nin
k
z
Fig. 4. Adherence Checker combining AC design with Tolerance Constraint Checker
As an example, consider again program Array given on the left side of Figure
1. The tolerance constraint extracted for operator + is (j ≥ 0 ∧ j ≤ 989, j ≥
0 ∧ j ≤ 999) and the program statement is j:=j+10. In SMT-Lib format, the
constraint is
(define-fun Q_1 () Bool (and (<= 0 |main::j|) (<= |main::j| 989)))
(define-fun Q_2 () Bool (and (<= 0 |main::j@1|)
(<= |main::j@1| 999)))
The structural mapping of the variables is represented as [|main :: j|.x], [10.y]
and [|main :: j@1| . z]. As a result, the mapped constraint can be represented
as follows.
(define-fun mappedQ_1 () Bool (and (and (<= 0 x) (<= x 989))
(= y 10)))
(define-fun mappedQ_2 () Bool (and (<= 0 z) (<= z 999)))
Figure 5 gives the Verilog code of the checker circuit belonging to this mapped
constraint. Note that the length of the input vectors have to be adapted to fit
the one provided by the hardware design of opAC .
module TCChecker(x,y,z, error);
parameter Nin = 32;
parameter Nout = 33;
input [Nin-1:0] x;
input [Nin-1:0] y;
input [Nout-1:0] z;
output error;
wire term__1;
wire term__2;
wire term__3;
wire term__4;
wire Q__1;
wire Q__2;
wire pre__gen_0;
assign term__1 = (x <= 989);
assign term__2 = (0 <= x);
assign Q__1 = (term__2 && term__1);
assign term__3 = (z <= 999);
assign term__4 = (0 <= z);
assign Q__2 = (term__4 && term__3);
assign pre__gen_0 = (y == 10);
assign error = !(( !(Q__1 && pre__gen_0) || Q__2));
endmodule
module AdherenceChecker(
input [31:0] inp1,
input [31:0] inp2,
output errorBit);
wire[32:0] outp;
Adder add(
.x(inp1),
.y(inp2),
.z(outp)
);
TCChecker check(
.x(inp1),
.x(inp2),
.z(outp),
.error(errorBit)
);
endmodule
Fig. 5. Verilog code of checker circuit (left) and its combination with Adder (right)
Experiments. In our experiments, we used the software analysis tool CPAchecker
to extract the tolerance constraints from a verification run. We employed the
tools Yosys [31] and ABC [5] for synthesis and generation of a CNF formula
that encodes the value of the error flag in dependence on all the inputs. Using
PicoSAT [9], we checked the unsatisfiability of the formula, denoting that the
error flag is never raised, i.e., the tolerance constraints are met by the imple-
mentation.
In the following, we give the results of our experiments. In our experiments
we studied tolerance constraints for addition (since this is the only operation for
which approximate hardware is currently publicly available). While it is often
accepted that in approximate computing a computation result is not functional
equivalent with a precise computation result, a approximate computation must
still well-behave. For example, memory accesses should remain safe or it should
still terminate or stick to a certain protocol. That is why, during program veri-
fication we considered one of these properties instead of functional behavior.
We extracted tolerance constraints from the verification of a number of hand-
crafted programs (including our three examples) and some programs from the
subcategory ControlFlow and ProductLines of the SV-COMP4 [6]. We chose
our programs to get tolerance constraints from a variety of verification prob-
lems and are very well aware that these programs are no typical candidates
for approximate computing. The handcrafted programs AddOne, EvenSum, and
MonotonicAdd should examine the addition of positive numbers. Programs sum,
quotient, and mirror matrix use the previously described technique to encode
termination proofs with assertions. To artificially enforce a difference between
the behavior of the approximate adder, we used program SpecificAdd which
checks that the addition of 30 + 50 is indeed 80. The programs from the SV-
COMP (the last 10 programs shown in Table 1) check protocol properties, e.g.
correct locking behavior.
We checked the tolerance constraints on a standard, non-approximate ripple
carry adder (RCA) and a set of approximate adders provided by the Karlsruhe
library of [29] (called ACA-I [30], ACA-II (ACA II N16 Q4)[19], ETAII [33],
GDA [32] and GeAr). Table 1 shows our results. For each program, we show
the number of additions #+, the number of program statements #stm, the
number of constraints extracted #tc and whether an adder meets the tolerance
constraints X or not ×.
Table 1. Results of experiments
program #+ #stm #tc RCA ACA-I ACA-II ETAII GDA GeAr
Array 1 15 1 X X X X X X
AddOne 1 22 1 X × × × × ×
Attach/Detach 1 26 1 X X X X X X
EvenSum 2 24 4 X × × × × ×
MonotonicAdd 1 20 1 X × × × × ×
SpecificAdd 1 13 1 X X × X X X
sum 2 26 2 X × × × × ×
quotient 2 35 2 X × × × × ×
mirror matrix 2 42 2 X × × × × ×
locks 5 5 114 31 X X X X X X
locks 8 8 171 255 X X X X X X
cdaudio 13 1888 23 X X X X X X
diskperf 19 981 12 X X X X X X
floppy4 31 1370 34 X X X X X X
kbfiltr2 11 759 15 X X X X X X
minepump s5 p64 2 741 3 X X X X X X
minepump s5 simulator 2 811 3 X X X X X X
clnt 4 13 575 18 X X X X X X
srvr 8 19 668 14 X X X X X X
4 Some additions first had to be brought in three-address code form and in some
programs we replaced some constant assignments by proper addition.
Our first observation is that except for program SpecificAdd which we cre-
ated to show a different behavior between the approximate adders either or all
approximate adders meet the extracted tolerance constraint or none of them.
This is because all approximate adders use the same principle: reduction of the
carry chain. In their addition, they use a set of subadders and the carry bit of
the previous subadder is either dropped or imprecisely predicted. The effect of
this reduction only shows off for specific numbers and these specific numbers
differ among the approximate adder. Hence, adding 30 and 50 failed only in the
approximate adders ACA-II.
Interestingly, the approximate adders meet the extracted tolerance constraints
for all of the SV-COMP programs. On the one hand, not all additions in the
programs have an effect on the correctness of the program (and thus verification
imposes no constraints on them). On the other hand, typically the additions
considered during verification which had an effect increase a variable value in
the range [0, 9] by one which can be computed precisely by the first subadder of
all approximate adders.
For our own programs, one can see that all sorts of cases occur: all approxi-
mate adders satisfy the extracted constraints (as is the case for program Array),
some do and some do not (on program SpecificAdd), and all do not. An instance
of the latter case is our example program AddOne from the right of Figure 1.
The variable u which is increased by 1 can be any positive integer (it is an
input). The derived constraint for operator + is ((1 ≤ u)[u . x, 1 . y], (sum 6=
0)[sum . z]) = (1 ≤ x ∧ y = 1, z 6= 0). For our verification of the property, we
require that the increase of that variable does not result in value zero, which
can be the case if the carry propagation is imprecise. Thus, here the approxi-
mate designs fail to satisfy the constraint. Hence, an execution of the program
on approximate hardware with these adders could reach the error state. The
imprecise carry propagation is also the reason why the approximate adders can-
not guarantee termination of programs sum, quotient, and mirror matrix. For
termination all three programs rely on an addition which is strongly monotonic
up to a certain threshold (maximal int value). However, due to the imprecise
carry propagation an addition of two positive integers may result in value zero.
7 Discussion
To compute requirements on AC hardware with the help of program verification,
further approaches are conceivable. For example, one could model the approx-
imate operation as a function call. This means, the approximate operations in
a program, e.g. the approximate addition, must be replaced by a call to cor-
responding function. Now, one applies a verification technique, e.g. [28], which
computes function summaries [18]. The function summary for the approximate
operation, in principle a description of a pre-/postcondition pair, gives us the
constraint on the AC hardware.
In another alternative one would also model the approximate operation as
a function call, but now one assumes that the behavior of the function approx
modeling the approximate operation is unknown. In this case, one may use a
technique like [2] which tries to generate the weakest specification for the function
approx which still ensures program correctness w.r.t. the desired property. The
specification for the function approx which is in principle an encoding of a pre-
/postcondition pair describes the requirement on the AC hardware.
We are confident that both alternatives could be used with our general ap-
proximation tolerance constraints approach. To use those alternatives the func-
tion summary and the inferred specification must be transformed into a tolerance
constraint checker. We think this is feasible because [28] and [2] already seem to
use logic formulae to express the function summary and the specification.
For this paper, we decided to use abstract interpretation as a first exam-
ple to generate the tolerance constraints for AC hardware. The disadvantage of
abstract interpretation is that we might get multiple constraints. The two alter-
natives only generate one constraint. In practice, we solved this problem such
that multiple constraints are conjuncted into a single constraint during the gen-
eration of the tolerance constraint checker. On the other hand, we do not need
to transform the approximate operations into function calls and the generation
of three-address code is rather standard for compilers. Another reason is that we
are already familiar with abstract interpretation. Additionally, the verification
tool CPAchecker which we typically use for verification is based on abstract
interpretation and analyses functions via in-lining.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new way of making software verification robust
against approximate hardware. Its basic principle is the derivation of constraints
on AC hardware from verification runs. We have shown our technique to be
sound, i.e., shown that the verification result carries over to a setting with AC
hardware when the hardware satisfies the derived constraints. First experimental
results have shown that the verification result often but not always carries over.
More experiments are, however, necessary when further AC implementations of
operations – besides approximate adders – become available.
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